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IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES by Richard
W. Bauman. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. 257 pp. Cloth $65.00/,42.00. ISBN:
080204803X. Paper $27.50/,18.00. ISBN: 0802083412.
Reviewed by Mark C. ModakTruran, Mississippi College School of Law. Email: mmodak@mc.edu.
Richard W. Bauman’s objective in “this book is to provide a rounded assessment of critical legal work at both
the theoretical and doctrinal levels” (pp.67), by focusing primarily “on American manifestations of critical legal
studies . . . in the decade after 1975” (p.6). Going back to the first wave of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) allows
Bauman to focus on the fundamental claims and arguments of the leading CLS figures before CLS “modulated
into new forms of theory, such as neopragmatism and postmodernism (and other styles of thinking that connote
novelty and supercession)” (p.10). His focus on the actual claims made by leading theorists also provides a
much richer and more accurate picture of CLS than focusing on an ideal CLS construct. In setting forth this
picture, Bauman acknowledges that he is “a liberal . . . convinced that liberalism, in a sophisticated and supple
form, has survived the critical legal onslaught and that, like a sapling in the buffeting wind, it is now stronger for
enduring such rough treatment” (p.11). Although he characterizes his book as “an essay in sympathetic
understanding and grounded in critique” (p.176), demonstrating the survival of contemporary liberalism seems
to be the primary motivation behind Bauman’s reevaluation of CLS. Consequently, his book will be most
valuable to other legal and political liberals who are interested in seeing how contemporary liberalism can
possibly meet or counter the objections against liberalism levied by a sophisticated CLS account.
In Chapter 2, Bauman begins his construction and critique of CLS by setting forth the various formulations of
legal, political, and economic liberalism offered by Karl Klare, Roberto Unger, David Kennedy, and Mark
Tushnet. He notes that the aim of their critiques of liberalism is to demonstrate the incoherence of liberal
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individuals and society. This incoherence then serves to
undermine “fundamental jurisprudential concepts, such as the rule of law, constitutionalism, and judicial
review,” which “are intertwined with liberal ideology” (p.14). To counter this argument, Bauman argues that
this critique simplistically identifies liberalism as a unitary set of metaphysical presuppositions about “the
subjectivity of values, radical individual autonomy, or the superiority of experience in the private realm over that
in the public realm” (p.15). Unlike the comprehensive liberalism of Immanuel Kant, Bauman emphasizes that
contemporary liberal theorists, like John Rawls, have offered accounts of liberalism independent of “a
comprehensive metaphysical or ontological framework” (p.30), and that they have not been “blind to the
importance of an individual’s nonpolitical interests or goods” (p.37). He further faults critical legal writing for
focusing on “the core of liberalism” rather than on what liberal theorists have actually said. As a result, he
maintains that critical legal authors have generally failed to understand the progressive possibilities of some
contemporary versions of liberal theory and that “many of the charges leveled against liberalism by critical legal
writers have missed the mark” (p.42).
Chapter 3 moves on to consider the account of liberal legal consciousness that critical legal scholars claim
pervades and distorts the “modern concept of law; legal institutions; and the respective roles of citizens, lawyers,
judges, and legislators” (p.43). Bauman notes that one of the key aspirations of CLS is to expose the liberal
ideological content of the law in order to emancipate individuals from the oppression of this ideology and the
legal system that reifies it. The ultimate goal of uncovering this liberal legal consciousness is to allow political
agents to “realize that their real interests are not served by current forms of law” and to bring about a
fundamental social transformation (p.43).
Bauman identifies several problems with this account of legal consciousness. First, it attributes a shared
consciousness to all liberal democracies which is contrary to the “widespread difference in the way that citizens
[in societies like the United States] identify their multifarious interests and, in so far as any talk of consciousness
makes sense, adopt distinctive modes of consciousness according to circumstances such as gender, ethnicity,
race, and other features” (p.75). In addition, the CLS rejection of realist epistemology results in an incoherent
account of legal consciousness. The prevailing historicism of CLS posits that “legal consciousness is all there is

to ‘reality’” (p.65). However, the demystification of liberal legal consciousness presupposes that “liberal legal
consciousness is completely out of touch with reality” (p.65). Unless humans have an external standard of truth,
the mystified position remains untouched because there is no way to access this alternative reality. Thus, like
Marxist theories of ideology, Bauman concludes that CLS lacks the conceptual foundations to demystify the
prevailing liberal legal consciousness and bring about the promised transformation of society.
In Chapter 4, Bauman focuses on the CLS critiques of contract doctrine offered by Duncan Kennedy, Roberto
Unger, Clare Dalton, Elizabeth Mensch, and Jay Feinman to evaluate the CLS technique of “trashing” existing
legal doctrine. He characterizes trashing as a pattern of analysis that identifies established doctrine, isolates its
implicit political or economic assumptions, reveals that the doctrine is ideologically tilted toward liberal values,
and shows that the legal doctrine is incoherent and manipulable. In other words, CLS trashing attempts to
undermine the foundations of liberal legal institutions by showing that law is not independent of politics in the
manner in which liberal legal and political theory suggests. Once this is realized, Duncan Kennedy has argued
that it will be possible to imagine “a community that selfconsciously and collectively chooses the values its law
will be geared to protect” so that it will be possible for the law to reflect an “altruist model of substantive
harmony” (pp.106, 107).
With respect to the particulars of contract law, CLS theorists have focused on the classical background to
contract law. Classical contract law is characterized as focusing on the consensual, private ordering of relations
by “independent, freedomseeking individuals” who should be allowed to pursue their selfinterest without
interference from courts except to enforce their bargainedfor exchange (p.84). As particularly embodied by
Williston’s treatise on contract law, “classical theory was one based on a developed set of clear rules that could
be derived from the logic of the contractual relationships” so that subsequent disputes could be “resolved simply
by deducing what legal consequences flowed from the classical model as elaborated by courts in the form of
settled rules” (p.87). CLS theorists claim that classical contract doctrine and its formalism are inconsistent with
the practice of contemporary courts limiting or extending liability based on “the doctrinal categories of reliance
based protection, promissory estoppel, unconscionability, duress, and standards of good faith and fair dealing”
(p.94). The CLS critique goes further than the critique of legal formalism levied by legal realism. CLS also
argues that “the policies and values (such as the facilitation of transactions or encouragement of economic
growth) favoured by their realist predecessors” are also incoherent so that “doctrinal indeterminacy and
inconsistency undermine the conventional modes of legal argument and judicial decision making” (p.79).
Consequently, the liberal promise of an autonomous legal system fails because neither legal rules nor an orderly
set of policies or values can provide a logic for deciding contract disputes that is autonomous from moral,
economic, and political premises.
Despite CLS’s claims, Bauman maintains that these accounts of contract doctrine largely repeat prior critiques,
like those of legal realists, and that their “thin” accounts suppress the role of important notions, such as fairness,
in their descriptions of the evolution of contract doctrine. CLS accounts also fail “to take adequate notice of
modern developments in which consumers, employees, and other parties to contracts have received special
solicitude from judges and legislators” so “that the values underlying contract doctrine have already been partly
changed in a way that stresses communal rather than individual interests” (p.122). They also ignore more recent
systematic treatments of contract law by theorists like Ian Macneil. Macneil treats contract law “as essentially a
relational, rather than a transactional, institution” and views contract relations as based on “cooperation and
trust” and regulated in part by “nonlegal sanctions” (pp.98, 99). Furthermore, Bauman claims that the CLS
critique “seriously exaggerates the standard of coherence among legal materials appropriate to this area of law”
(p.79), so that it presumes rather than demonstrates that “the ideas of promisebased and reliancebased liability
are mutually exclusive” (p.119). Rather than paralyzing common law reasoning, Bauman argues that “the
presence of principles that seem to pull in different directions is in fact necessary to the growth and adaptability
of the law” (p.79). Therefore, he concludes that the “main principles underlying contract doctrine . . . are not
fundamentally contradictory, nor do they create an overall scheme that is embarrassingly indeterminate” (pp.8
9).
The most important contribution of this book may be its attempt in Chapter 5 to identify the “Communitarian
Vision of Critical Legal Studies” and explain why the envisioned political transformation has failed to

materialize. Bauman’s approach in this chapter is more one of understanding than of defensive critique. The
perplexing thing about calling CLS a “Movement” is that it hesitates or refuses to offer a clear vision of post
liberal society. Bauman helpfully identifies two paradoxes that explain why the CLS Movement has refused to
propose such a communitarian vision explicitly. First, the “paradox of engagement” arises from critical legal
theorists advocating the perpetual critique of liberalism to facilitate a political transformation of society “while
refusing on principle to disclose in detail their substantive political views” (p.124). Second, the “paradox of
postponement” arises because CLS not only recognizes that political values inevitably shape the law but also
deprivileges critics from speaking for the community and dictating what values should shape a legal regime in
the future. To explain these paradoxes, Bauman notes that politics for CLS should be “a concrete, local,
communitywide process that gives no special authority to the critical legal commentator” so that the members
of the community “should be free to work out through discussion their own version of just principles based on
circumstances known intimately and peculiarly to them” (p.163). “The critical legal approach is to stress the
virtues of solidarity, intersubjective communication and cooperation, but of course the radical critics are sternly
opposed to any reconstitution of society based on such communal notions as differentiated power, hierarchical
dependency, or the dominance of tradition as a bonding or legitimating force” (pp.15556). Despite these claims
about the nature of political decision making, Bauman’s conclusion is that to continue their project, “critical
legal writers must begin to spell out the practical political ramifications of their ideals” so that “[r]eaders of the
radical literature should be given the chance to compare the principles espoused by critical legal studies with the
actual forms of social and political life to which those principles are supposed to lead” (pp.170, 171). Without
taking this step, Bauman maintains that the communitarian vision of CLS will never come into being.
While Bauman provides persuasive rebuttals to many of the CLS criticisms of liberalism, contemporary
liberalism suffers from some of the same shortcomings Bauman observes about CLS. For example, Bauman
criticizes CLS for not having a conceptual foundation (an external standard of truth) to demystify the liberal
legal consciousness claimed to be inherent in the law. Bauman also argues that contemporary liberal theorists,
like John Rawls, avoid the “comprehensive metaphysical or ontological framework” (p.30), held to be
incoherent by CLS. However, Bauman fails to realize that Rawls similarly lacks a conceptual foundation to
justify his “political not metaphysical” form of political liberalism. In POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Rawls
argues for a nonuniversal rational justification of law based on a political conception of justice (“implicit in the
public political culture of a democratic society”) because comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines are not rational. In THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Franklin Gamwell convincingly
contends that Rawls’s evaluation of all comprehensive doctrines as not rational constitutes a (negative)
comprehensive doctrine, which is incoherent. In other words, this comprehensive doctrine is selfcontradictory
because it presupposes—the possibility of rational comprehensive evaluation—what it denies—the possibility of
rational comprehensive evaluation. Both legal liberalism—at least if Rawls is exemplary of contemporary
liberalism as Bauman argues—and CLS are thus incoherent because they lack external standards of truth to
justify their accounts of law. Consequently, despite Bauman’s noble attempts to chronicle the survival of
liberalism, the future of legal theory may not be found in either liberalism or the CLS Movement but in a turn to
“postmodern” comprehensive or metaphysical conceptual foundations for the law.
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